Calcutta Notebook

DRC

The people of Howrah seem to have held a mirror before each major electoral party. The CPI(M) and its new-found allies of the media are trying to convince everyone that the increase in the share of votes cast for that party means it is turning around, people’s support is increasing. In fact, the quirks of the simple majority electoral system practised in this country place the CPI(M) as winner in two out of the seven assembly segments of the constituency. Convenient manipulation of statistics is, of course, legitimate legerdemain in political propaganda. However, let us hope that, confidentially, the party retains knowledge of the watershed between fact and "lies, damn lies and statistics."

Because, factually, the CPI(M) received 3,99,203 votes in 2011 and 3,99,422 in 2013. The faithful still walk to the booth, but two years of a highly criticised government have won the principal opposition party only 219 extra votes—an increase of 0.0005%. If this suggests turn-around to the political pundits of the party and the media, who are going to break up their daydreams? To this correspondent, however, it hardly looks as if people are showering accolades on what they see to be the party of the future. Of course, drawing the faithful to the booths is, by itself, no mean achievement. At one stage, such was the ire faced by the cadre and their consequent demoralisation that even the faithful started giving a miss to party programmes. The unforgivable murder of Sudipta in police custody, and the refusal of the police to allow prime demo space to all but the ruling party was astutely used by the CPI(M) to consolidate its ranks. However, the negligible increase in votes suggests that the people have yet to forgive a quarter century of authoritarian misrule.

A CPI(M) acknowledging mistakes in implementation from the lips of no less than the former chief minister, who, surely, was in charge of implementation of policy (if anyone was), appears contrite enough for some of the left to venture into its parlour. What is missed is the stubborn continuation of support to a policy which considers investment by the captains of big capital as the engine of development. A party which frankly supports big capital and is willing to subsidise big investment is hardly a party of the left. It is a disaster as far as West Bengal is concerned because big investment is job-less, and the major problem of the people of the state is unemployment. The autocracy practised by the cadre and the bhadralok hangers-on seems to have been forgotten or forgiven by these leftists, although the people show no signs of doing so, correctly dismissing the near-apologies of some leaders as the proverbial tears of the crocodile. A leftist alliance must rest on some common political core of policies based on a pro-people economic understanding. Of course, an alliance for seats and votes among opposition groups is another story altogether.

Let us next take a "worst scenario" look at the TMC tally of 4,26,387 votes. The BJP had won 48,324 votes in 2011. In the worst case (as argued by the BJP, who neither put up a candidate nor supported the TMC publicly) the BJP retained this support which spontaneously slid into the vote boxes in favour of the TMC. Such a fandango would reduce the TMC's own pull to 3,78,063, some 20 thousand votes behind the CPI(M). However, this scenario is hardly credible. The absence of the BJP in the arena does not suggest two very productive years for that party in this constituency. It is quite possible that the BJP had already lost supporters to the TMC and, also, contrariwise, some BJP supporters could just have sat at home, rather than vote TMC. Each of these factors would increase the estimate of the TMC's own pull and, quite possibly, give a lead over the CPI(M).

To continue with the worst scenario for the TMC, let us turn to the Congress factor. The Congress polled 96,731 votes. If this is considered to be the Congress contribution to the TMC-Congress tally in 2011, the TMC contribution in 2011 comes out to be 4,87,151. This means that between 2011 and 2013, the TMC's own pull has decreased by 12 to 22 percent (varying the BJP factor between zero and 100 per cent). Again, the 2013 picture becomes better from the TMC standpoint if the Congress contribution was higher in 2011, because, then, the TMC's own pull would have been awarded a lower estimate in 2011, leading to a smaller vote loss between 2011-13. But, this is uncertain territory. The presidency of Pranab Mukherjee and the sight of a Congress active against the TMC might have increased the tally in 2013, but it is difficult to accept that so many criminal assaults on women and scam after scam in Delhi would leave unaffected supporters of the Congress of 2011. The bad governance factor would surely have decreased the tally in 2013. Which factor predominated?

Whichever way one looks at the results, it is clear that the TMC has lost support in Howrah. The TMC response is not self-critical in any way, blame for the loss being assigned to seasonal return home of upcountry labour leading to a dip in the turn-out, and confusion over a Lok Sabha by-poll and the panchayet elections within six months. The last argument is difficult to understand, while supporters sitting at home or going back home on polling day cannot be good news, surely, for an electoral party.

Frontier
Vol. 45, No. 51, June 30 -Jul 6, 2013

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